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 1 
Summary 
This thesis concerns the issue of how MNE affects their taxable profit 
through transfer pricing. When companies transfer assets between 
subsidiaries in different states they need to price the assets so the taxable 
profit that arises reflects the value of the subsidiary. The pricing is 
calculated to comply with ‘arm’s length price’, which means the internal 
price should be the same as if the asset was purchased from an independent 
enterprise. The development of the international market has resulted in 
different non-material assets being transferred between subsidiaries. The 
uniqueness of the assets makes it hard to find a comparable transfer price. 
The problem arises when MNE over- or underestimates the transfer price to 
be able to report the profit in the state with lowest corporate taxation. The 
lack of comparable assets and the amount of accepted transfer pricing 
methods makes it easy for MNE to manipulate the pricing. 
    
The problem has been given attention on many levels and OECD has 
developed guidelines on how MNE shall act and how states shall react. A 
competitive situation arises between states as they try to attract foreign 
investment to get job opportunities and economic development in the 
region. Many states offer cheap workforce, poor regulation of 
environmental control and tax breaks which results in that states and their 
population ends up in a worse position than before.  
    
There is no supranational organisation that offers an international tax 
regulation. It is within state sovereignty to regulate taxation and impose 
obligations upon companies. Critics claims MNE should accept 
responsibility for their acts and not exploit the weaknesses in the system, 
while others say MNEs’ only obligation is to comply with the regulation 
within the state. Different organisations have highlighted the issue and 
recommended increased documentation requirements and transparency in 
the system. It is imported that each part knows what is expected of them.   
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Sammanfattning 
Uppsatsen berör frågeställningen hur multinationella företag påverkar 
skattebasen via internprissättning. När företag överför tillgångar mellan 
enheter i olika länder krävs det att tillgångarna prissätts så att den 
beskattningsbara vinsten som uppkommer speglar omsättningen/värdet på 
enheten i det landet. Prissättningen beräknas med en ’armlängds avstånd’, 
vilket menas att det interna priset ska vara det samma som om varan 
handlats med en oberoende part. Marknadsutvecklingen har resulterat i att 
fler typer av ickemateriella tillgångar överförs mellan bolag. Tillgångarnas 
originalitet gör det svårt att finna en jämförbar prissättning. Problematiken 
uppkommer när företagen över- eller under estimerar det interna priset för 
att kunna överföra vinsten till det land med lägst bolagsskatt. Bristen på 
jämförbara tillgångar och mängden accepterade metoder som används för att 
finna ett pris gör att företag lätt manipulerar prissättningen.  
    
Problematiken har uppmärksammats på många plan och OECD har 
utvecklat riktlinjer för hur företag ska agera och stater ska reagera. En 
konkurrensmässig situation uppstår mellan stater när de vill attrahera 
företag. Etablering av utländska bolag innebär arbetsmöjligheter och 
ekonomisk utveckling i regionen. Ett flertal länder erbjuder billig 
arbetskraft, svag reglering när det kommer till miljöhantering och nu även 
skattelättnader vilket sammantaget resulterar sämre position för staten och 
dess invånare. 
    
Det finns inget överstatligt organ som ger en övergripande internationell 
skattereglering, utan det åligger staterna att reglera skatter och företags 
skyldigheter i landet. Kritiker har ifrågasatt om inte de multinationella 
företagen borde ta eget ansvar för sina handlingar och inte utnyttja 
svagheterna i systemet, medan andra menar att företag enda skyldighet är att 
följa de regler som åligger dem i landet de verkar. Olika organ har 
uppmärksammat problemet och den främsta rekommendationen för både 
stater och företag är ökad dokumentation om prissättningar och transparens i 
systemet. Det är viktigt att alla parter vet vad som förväntas av dem. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background  
For the last couple of decades globalisation has substantially accelerated. An 
important reason for the fast development of some developing countries into 
fast growing economies has been globalisation. Globalisation has thus 
become a contributor to the society welfare as it has resulted in more job 
opportunities, increased transfers of technology, higher revenues and 
increased buildings of schools and medical facilities etc. The rapid 
globalisation that has taken place has not only resulted in a dramatic change 
of societies but also in the accelerated growth of multinational enterprises 
(MNEs). The improvement of infrastructure makes it easy to transfer goods 
across the world and gives MNEs an opportunity to increase their business. 
Any company now has the possibility to invest in states with large untapped 
labour resources and underutilized natural resources that are necessary for 
that particular company without having to transfer the legal home of the 
company. The elimination of boundaries has also increased the freedom for 
foreign investors, which has led to increased economic growth for both 
states and MNE. The well-established foreign direct investment (FDI) 
protection that exists to avoid discrimination of foreign companies in the 
host state makes the international market attractive for MNEs seeking 
growth.  
    
The economic growth that follows when a company establishes in a state 
has led to that the competition for FDI between states has increased. One 
way for states to attract foreign investors is to create a regulatory framework 
adapted to fit the needs of MNE. The trend has resulted in producing states 
lowering their standards when it comes to employment and environmental 
regulation. Countries aspiration to attract FDI has to some extent resulted in 
a situation where they are in competition with each other and one might say 
the competing states engage in a ‘race to the bottom’.1 
    
International regulation through in treaties and international agreements 
mainly concerns investment protection. There is a lack of international 
                                                
1 Shah, Anup ”Corporations and workers Rights” 
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regulation when it comes to the responsibilities of MNEs regarding minimal 
standard of socially responsibly business conduct. Many of the MNE 
declare their commitment to  ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ (CSR). 
However, it is not universally agreed what should be included in the CSR. 
Traditionally CSR covers the company’s labour conditions and the 
environmental effect of their production as a response to the lack on 
international regulation in this area.  
    
Recently some MNEs have started to include the regulation of taxation as an 
aspect of CSR when deciding on where to establish subsidiaries and what 
function they shall have. MNE normally wants to move taxable profits to 
states that offer a lower taxation level. The approach of lowering standards 
and to give MNEs’ tax advantages are not illegal methods for the states nor 
is it an illegal act by MNE to gear towards the favourable regulations 
offered in some states. In the long run loosing out of tax revenues does 
however damage the development of states and can be considered to be a 
human rights and developmental problem.  
1.2 Identifying the problem 
The issue of transfer pricing, the price set on assets bought by one unit from 
another unit within the same enterprise, has become an widespread issue 
since the MNE can choose where they wish to report their taxable profit by 
mispricing the asset. The correct term is transfer mispricing, but for 
simplification, it will be referred to as transfer pricing (TP). It is not clear 
how extensive the tax revenue losses are due to transfer mispricing, but it is 
known that approximately 30 % of the global trade is between unified 
companies.2 This indicates that minor mispricing of internal transaction can 
lead to big losses in tax revenues. If the price is set too low the profit moves 
from the selling unit’s state to the buying unit’s state and vice versa.  
 
There are different issues that can be discussed regarding the MNEs’ way of 
working in different countries. The most common issues often regard human 
rights and environmental violations since these issues are most obvious to 
us. It has become more and more common for the MNEs to take an official 
stand when it comes to e.g. child labour or the demand for environmentally 
friendly materials in their products. What often gets overlooked is the fact 
                                                
2 UN, ”Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing Countries”, Foreword 
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that an operational tax system is fundamentally important for the economic 
growth and development in a developing country. Tax revenues are the 
necessary financial means for a state to build schools, hospitals and 
infrastructure. When the MNEs choose to transfer its profit to another state, 
the first state misses tax revenues. Even though the MNE is using the 
system to avoid taxation, e.g. via transfer pricing, they pay the amount they 
are obliged to and are abiding by the laws of both counties. This results in a 
problematic legal situation.  
1.2.1    Purpose    
The purpose of this thesis is to identify how the lack of international 
regulation of TP becomes taxation-problem for the state. When not 
reporting as much taxable profit as a domestic company would do, the state 
will loose out on tax revenue and MNEs will get unjustified advantages 
towards domestic companies. This thesis will aim to give an understanding 
to the problematic situation by answering these following questions:  
- What is transfer pricing and what problems can it cause 
- How has the international community recognised transfer-pricing 
issues? 
- What is expected by states and MNEs regarding transfer pricing? 
The taxation issues regarding MNE are rapidly changing and it is hard for 
the states to close all the loopholes with the speed it requires. There are no 
worldwide organisations that control the MNEs global taxation 
responsibilities and therefore it is hard to detect these loopholes. If the 
system gives the MNE a disadvantage, it will be within the MNE’s interest 
to alert the taxation authority on the unfair taxation level. Many bilateral 
agreements and other existing taxation regulations therefore focus on 
protecting MNE from double taxation. The double taxation is less of a 
problem today than it used to be. The existing protection regulation has led 
to MNE getting tax advantages or even being exempted from taxation in the 
host states. This makes it possible for the MNE to eliminate or reduce their 
taxation and the low tax burden gives the MNE a competitive advantage 
over local smaller businesses. The low tax burden hurt not only 
governmental investment and economic growth but also employment in 
regional companies.3 
    
                                                
3 OECD Newsroom 
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During the last decades of economic development, states have signed 
bilateral agreements that deal with conflicts regarding national taxations 
law4 for trade. These tax treaties concern how the national regulations 
should be interpreted when they are in conflict with each other. They do not 
include how states should tax the MNE within its jurisdiction or what 
responsibilities lay upon the companies within the country. This benefits 
MNE since they are free to take any actions they wish as long as they stay 
within the national regulations. 
    
CSR is a fairly well established and accepted tool to prevent violations of 
human rights and environmental issues. When committed to writing a CSR 
MNEs are pushed to take a stand and give their point of view on these 
matters. There have been discussions whether or not taxation should be 
included in the company’s CSR. The basic idea of CSR is to help them state 
and implement a transparent set of values that represent the company. The 
CSR concept was developed to be a positive tool in the process towards a 
better sustainable development. The lack of follow up of the CSR is 
however considered to be somewhat problematic since the due diligence 
approach mainly regard the efforts made by the MNE and not the result. 
Some critics say that MNE only need to ‘mark the box’, as they have tried 
to follow the intentions set in their CSR.5 Others say the CSR is of great 
importance since it creates transparency for all subsidiaries within the same 
corporation.6 When a company has stated its commitments to CSR and 
adopted management systems to comply with it, it is easier for its 
subsidiaries to follow.  
    
Over the past couple of decades the MNEs have more aggressively focused 
on minimising their taxation burden and many MNEs create subsidiaries 
and shell-companies to take advantages of the lower taxation levels in some 
states. Tax regulation lies within the state sovereignty and when MNE takes 
control over their tax liability through tax planning it is considered to be a 
violation towards the state.7 The regulations that exist today do not reflect 
                                                
4 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 591 
5 Corporate Watch ”What’s wrong with Corporate Social Responsibility?” p. 11 
6 European Parliament resolution (2012/2098(INI)) 
7 Jeffery, Ramon J. ”The Impact of State Sovereignty on Global Trade and…” p. 734 
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the economic collaboration of corporate entities within MNE or the value of 
intellectual property and this is damaging for the development of states.8      
    
1.2.2 Limitation and scope  
This thesis will look into how companies set these prices and which 
methods that are being used to transfer profits. There will be no description 
or comparison between different states taxation levels since the main focus 
will be on the function of transfer pricing. The result of these transfer-
pricing policies has generally been that developing states are mostly affected 
by losses in tax revenues, and industrialised/developed states have 
benefitted. I will however not limit this paper to only concern the transfer of 
taxable profit from a developing state to a developed, but rather focus on the 
violation of state sovereignty when the MNE are allowed to ‘choose’ where 
to report their taxable profit. These various actions taken by MNEs are 
normally legal. I will discuss the different positions a MNE can have 
towards taxation. 
    
In this paper I will accept CSR as a successful tool and not regard the to 
critics’ discussion about the success or failure of the CSR concept. I will 
however discuss whether or not taxation is a suitable issue for CSR.  
1.3 Method 
This thesis will focus on different sides of the transfer pricing mechanism. It 
is important to understand how profits are transferred via transfer pricing 
between the MNE corporate units in different states. I have used a 
descriptive and analytical method to present the functioning of transfer 
pricing. The description is important in order to understand if companies 
can or should take responsibility on where the profits should be taxed. 
    
I will analyse reports written on this matter, but this paper is not a 
comparative analysis of which system is better than the other. It is rather an 
analysis of important elements that should be taken into consideration both 
by companies and by states. I will not be able to present any legal cases 
                                                
8 OECD Newsroom 
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since tax avoidance in not an illegal act. I will however regard cases given 
attention to in media where the MNE actions have been questioned.  
    
It is not totally settled what a company shall include in their CSR but 
taxation is getting more focus in the international debate.9 To establish if 
MNE should include taxation into their CSR I will look into the on-going 
debate, but especially what different organisations guidelines state about 
taxation and CSR.  
1.4 Disposition 
This thesis is divided into three parts. The first part (chapter two) describes 
the problems regarding transfer pricing and how the MNE can use transfer 
pricing as an economic tool to avoid taxation. The chapter describes how it 
works and why it is a problem that companies transfer their profit from one 
state to another. The chapter’s aim is also to give a clear view on why fair 
taxation is important to others than the state in focus. This problem is 
getting more attention. To show how it has been recognised in the media I 
will present a short summary of three examples. The first one deals with 
how the international coffee-chain Starbucks transferred all its profits from 
the United Kingdom to states with lower taxation levels. The second 
example concerns the online book-selling giant Amazon’s establishment in 
Luxemburg and the last case concerns Zambia Sugar’s usage of bilateral tax 
agreements and developing states tax breaks. 
    
The second part (chapter three) focuses on the recognition this issue has had 
in international legal and policy instruments. The chapter will describe the 
difficulties to get a harmonised international taxation system when there is 
no supranational organisation to set international taxations rules. The 
chapter will therefore focus on international organisations that have the 
ability to influence its members. The main focus will be on OECD ‘Transfer 
Pricing Guidelines’. Even though the OECD has a limited number of 
member states, it has developed guidelines that subsequently have been 
adopted by both the UN and regional associations like the EU and The 
Pacific Association of Tax Administration (PATA). Most MNEs and all 
OECD member states as well as several other states consider these 
guidelines of great importance.  
                                                
9 UNRISD, ”The ’Pay Your Taxes’ Debate: Perspectives on Corporate Taxation…” p. 5 
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The third part (chapters four and five) will focus on what is expected of the 
states and companies. It is within the state sovereignty to regulate taxation 
but to close loopholes is difficult without collaboration with other states. 
MNEs have to act within the country’s framework of taxes. The MNE’s TP 
will be discussed in this context. I will also present the possibility to include 
taxation in the company’s CSR.  
 12 
2 International Taxation & 
Transfer Pricing 
2.1 Positions towards taxation  
There are three ways a MNE can act regarding taxation. The first position is 
for those that do not adjust their structure or actions with specific intent to 
lower their taxation burden. The second is tax evasion and the third position 
is tax avoidance. 
2.1.1 No adaption 
The first position is to not regard taxation as a possibility to lower the 
corporate costs. The company is indifferent to the tax level and do not adapt 
their business structure to avoid taxation. This position is preferred by states 
since it gives them the freedom to develop a system suitable for the 
corporate environment in the state. The tax authorities can change domestic 
tax regulation to close any loopholes that arise in the domestic system, but 
cannot control the international tax system. This position is common for 
companies that only work within one state and less common for MNE that 
function on the international market and has the possibility to use other 
states tax systems.  
2.1.2 Tax evasion 
The second position towards taxation is ‘tax evasion’ and its extent is harder 
to estimate since it is an illegal approach. Tax evasion means that the 
taxpayer withholds assets from the tax authorities so they do not become 
subject to taxation. Any criminal activity or offence of dishonesty that 
involves the reduction of taxation payment will result in a punishment of 
civil penalties.10  
    
MNE can create a business structure that makes it impossible, or at least 
difficult, for third parties to hide assets from the tax authority. To actively 
counteract tax evasion by third parties MNEs can e.g. demand specified 
                                                
10 KPMG, ”Tax and Corporate Social Responsibility”, p. 15 
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receipts on every purchase or service and demand correct actions by 
suppliers, customers or contractors. Tax evasion will however not be the 
focus of this paper even though it concerns the MNE taxation philosophy 
and a good possibility for MNE to limit third parties’ incentive for tax 
evasion.11 
    
A sharp distinction is often drawn between tax evasion and avoidance where 
the latter is considered to be the legal version of the former.12  
2.1.3 Tax avoidance 
The third position on taxation is tax avoidance, which means that a company 
adapts a system for which the purpose is to avoid being taxed higher than 
the company consider being necessary. Tax avoidance is difficult to handle 
since the various used methods of avoidance are so different and hard to 
identify. The common denominator for the problematic issue of avoidance is 
the actions being made within the legal sphere to either minimise their 
taxable profit within a state or transfer the profit to states with lower 
corporate taxation.13   
2.1.3.1 Pure tax avoidance 
Economists are often looking for ‘pure’ tax avoidance, which means there is 
no excess burden such as: information problems, transactions cost and 
institutional restriction for the MNE. This means a MNE can with simple 
adjustments use well-known loopholes without any extra cost for the 
company or the society.14 Actions that lead to pure tax avoidance rarely 
exist since there is often a direct effect relating to any action made by a 
company. If a company changes its structure and turn the company into a 
trust or a large limited partnership, these adjustments might lead to a more 
effective taxation for the company.15 This type of actions is not a problem in 
a legal context and even if it may result in lower tax burdens for the MNE 
there is a risk that this type of actions brings disadvantages to other areas. 
MNE need to make careful considerations when adapting these structural 
changes. According to some writers are many of the actions that are 
                                                
11 United Kingdom Government ”Reducing tax evasion and avoidance” 
12 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 53 
13 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 54 
14 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 64 
15 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 67 
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considered to be pure tax avoidance by the MNE, on the borderline of being 
classified as tax evasion.16  
    
One way of dealing with this problem might be to increase the excess 
burden for the MNE. This would mean a MNE have to go through a more 
complicated process to avoid taxation. The main problem of making the 
excess burden higher for MNEs is that it usually increases the excess burden 
for the controlling state as well.17 The implementation of controls could 
result in extensive cost for both companies and states and there is no 
guarantee the tax revenues would cover the costs for the extra controls.  
2.1.3.2 Legal aspects 
Corporate changes that do not alter the substantive character of an activity 
or transaction, but turn it into a more favourable taxation position than 
before is of interest from a legal point of view.18 These actions are unlikely 
to occur if the company has not abused the system in some way.  
    
In many developing states, the lack of experience is one reason for generally 
poorly drafted taxation regulations. Normally, there are many loopholes that 
MNE takes advantage of when they try to avoid taxation. These loopholes 
rarely demands any specific measures by the MNEs and this is one of the 
reasons why not any extra burden affects the MNE when avoiding tax in a 
state with developing tax regulation. For internal transactions and business 
agreements, e.g. transfer pricing as defined below, it is hard for an outsider 
to determine what ‘constitutes a legitimate business purpose’ and what 
arrangements are not functional and only used to avoid taxation.19  Without 
a clear and stable legislation that gives every part a clear guidance it is 
difficult for local authorities to discover as well as to close the existing 
loopholes. Today, the MNE are much more flexible and can easily change 
their structure so that they can use any loophole. The risk with a very stable 
legislation is that it could become too inflexible and this might complicate 
the procedure when to close loopholes in the system.  
    
                                                
16 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 53 
17 United Kingdom Government ”Reducing tax evasion and avoidance” 
18 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 71 
19 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 73 
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Businesses might claim that tax regulation is not based on universal 
principles. The main goal for tax regulations is to get in tax revenues but at 
the same time is there no universal ‘right’ tax rate that determines taxation 
levels. There is rather a ‘right’ way for the companies to act that 
consequently will result in the right amount of taxation.20  According to this 
way of reasoning the obligation does not lie within the tax rate paid to each 
state, but rather that the company has acted according to any regulation they 
are subjected to. 
2.1.3.3 Impact of tax avoidance 
“Tax avoidance (…) is a market response by the taxpayer to a structure that 
is non-neutral and discriminatory, but is taken as given or exogenously 
determined. Through behavioural adjustments in markets, under the given 
tax structure, taxpayers seek to reduce their tax liabilities and, in effect, shift 
part of their tax burdens to others”21 
    
This statement regarding the tax burden being shifted from the company to 
another taxpayer is only partly true. It is true in the sense that companies 
utilise public goods such as infrastructure, educated workforce etc. that are 
financed via tax revenues paid by other citizens. However, it is normally not 
possible for the tax authorities do demand higher tax revenues from other 
taxpayers to cover for the extra cost.22  The loss of tax revenues when 
companies avoid paying tax affects the society in different ways and 
normally public expenditures needs to be cut.23   
    
The state obligation to uphold the welfare in the society is hard to comply 
with if it cannot rely on stable revenues and stability in the tax structure. It 
is of importance for states to have knowledge of the accessible amount of 
tax revenues when calculating the national budget. When tax revenues 
decreases, e.g. by tax avoidance, the government will prioritise to cover 
immediate and necessary issues. This is problematic since governments will 
thereby not take preventive measures to solve long-term problems e.g. 
improving education, environment or medical care.24  
                                                
20 KPMG, ”Tax and Corporate Social Responsibility”, p. 17 
21 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 78 
22 KPMG, ”Tax and Corporate Social Responsibility”, p. 20 
23 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 71 
24 KPMG, ”Tax and Corporate Social Responsibility”, p. 20 
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If a subsidiary within a MNE transfers profits, they will pay lower taxation 
compared to if they would have paid profit tax on the full profit in the state 
they are situated in. By other transactions, these less taxed profits could be 
transferred back to the subsidiary if necessary. These actions consequently 
give the subsidiary a competitive advantage towards smaller national 
companies. MNE are subject to more than one legal system and can ‘pick 
the raisins out of the cake’ in the global society, while local companies do 
not have that choice. National companies have to pay more local tax and this 
puts them in a less favourable competitive position vs. a MNE that has 
reduced its costs by tax avoidance. The MNE can thus out-compete the local 
company by its use of tax avoidance. 
2.2  States, tax and sovereignty 
State sovereignty prohibits implementation of direct or indirect regulation of 
companies in other states.25 This principle of sovereignty concerns any act 
committed by the subsidiary even if the act is completely controlled by the 
parent company. Regulation of taxation levels is within the state sovereignty 
and therefore it is not allowed for other jurisdictions to regulate taxation 
within the states territory. A state is not allowed to use the MNE as a 
‘Trojan horse’ to create regulation in another state no matter if it concerns 
illegal acts with criminal charges or tax regulations.26 So when defining who 
is accountable for an action committed by a unit within a MNE the rule is 
‘one brand – two responsibilities’. This emphasises that each unit of an 
MNE is considered to be an individual company and has the responsibility 
to act according to the regulation within the jurisdiction of the state where it 
is stationed.27  
    
Since it is not within the culture of a company to pay more tax than legally 
necessary, it will, if given the opportunity, try to avoid taxation. MNEs 
regard the differences in national corporate taxation as imperfections in the 
taxation system and they use these imperfections as an economic tool. 
Therefore, even if the parent company and the subsidiary have different 
responsibilities they are still under the same corporate umbrella and profits 
                                                
25 Jeffery, Ramon J. ”The Impact of State Sovereignty on Global Trade and…” p. 734 
26 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 597 
27 The Guardian ”OECD calls for crackdown on tax avoidance by multinationals” 
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can easily be transferred via transfer pricing to the company with the lowest 
corporate taxation. MNE justify the advanced tax planning via transfer 
pricing as ‘one brand-one profit’. Since the state sovereignty does not allow 
implementation of tax regulation that concerns the taxation in another state, 
a state cannot get the overall right to tax every unit of a MNE, nor can the 
state implement regulations that would prosecute the MNE if transferring 
profit to a state with low corporate tax. As long as every act is according to 
each states regulation it is not illegal to use the system with tax planning and 
place subsidiaries in states with low corporate tax. 
2.2.1 State interest  
Transfer pricing is an important issue for both the taxpayer and the tax 
administrator. The transfer price concerns the inter-trade within a MNE but 
the pricing will also determine where the profit will be reported and taxed. 
The tax administrators in a state do not have an incentive to stop trade or 
make trade difficult for the MNE. If there is a larger profit reported in the 
state, there will be high tax revenues for the state. It lies within the states 
interest to create an environment so that the MNE want to report the profit 
in the state.28 The states focus lies on the supervision of how the transfer is 
made. MNEs thereby needs to make it credible that the transfer price 
charged for a transaction in material assets, services or intellectual property 
is fair by adapting the ‘arm’s length’ principle.29 No concern is given to 
questions like who has the ‘right’ to collect tax on the profit or who as the 
biggest ‘need’ of tax revenue. It does not matter if State A claim the right to 
taxation since it is where the seller and buyer made an agreement or if State 
B claim the right to taxation because it was in State B where the item the 
item was manufactured.30 
    
Politicians use taxation levels as important tools and the main discussion 
regard tax rates at national level. The effective tax levels and procedures on 
international level create debates. Internal disagreements create political 
obstacles that complicate the process of effectively trying to control and 
overcome the problems of tax avoidance on an international level.31 
    
                                                
28 Jeffery, Ramon J. ”The Impact of State Sovereignty on Global Trade and…” p. 741 
29 Gupta, Sayantan, ”’Transfer pricing’ – an international issue…” p. 40 
30 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 2 
31 Cooper, Graeme ”Tax Avoidance and the Rule of Law” p. 82-83 
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MNE care about their global profit and how much it shall be taxed, while 
states care about revenues and not implementing regulations that results in 
double taxation for the MNE.32  
2.2.2 State concerns 
States focus on three types of problems when it comes to MNE and taxation. 
The first is the jurisdictional issue that determine which state has the right to 
tax the MNE. This issue often raise many subsequent questions such as who 
has the priority if both states have equal right? What if a tax base should 
arise in one state and not the other? Shall that state be allowed to tax the 
base even if it the other state has priority? It results in tax competition 
between states.33 States regulate these issues with bilateral agreements or 
‘Advanced Pricing Agreements’ with individual MNEs. When making these 
agreements they regard open-market conditions and assumptions for the 
future.34 These agreements are necessary for the states since both states have 
the same legal value and no state is superior the other. State A does not have 
the possibility to implement regulations on how the subsidiary company 
shall act in State B and vice versa. Without international agreements a 
‘accountability gap’ or ‘governance gap’ would arise when the MNE work 
on the international market. 
    
The second issue is the allocation of MNE resources. The MNE wishes to 
allocate its recourses in the most optimal way while the state focus on how 
the cost and income from these recourses are allocated amongst states 
concerned.35 When MNE transfers assets between jurisdictions it creates a 
problem that do not exist when companies function within one nation.36 The 
state must work in a preventive manner and consider different ways MNE 
can take advantages of the system but they also have to be aware of the risk 
of double taxation.37 
   
The third issue that states take into consideration is how MNE value the 
assets when setting their transfer price. The price is mainly bookkeeping 
                                                
32 Gupta, Sayantan, ”’Transfer pricing’ – an international issue…” p. 40 
33 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 596  
34 Gupta, Sayantan, ”’Transfer pricing’ – an international issue…” p. 45 
35 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 596 
36 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 594 
37 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 596 
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prices set for internal reasons but since the transaction is crossing states’ 
borders the transfer price is also necessary for the tax authorities’ 
calculation of border taxes and corporate income taxation. The state has the 
possibility to influence the transfer price.38 
2.3 Transfer pricing 
OECD defines Transfer Pricing as a phenomenon: “a transfer of something 
of value (e.g. assets) and/or the determination or substantial renegotiation of 
existing commercial arrangements within an MNE group”.39   
    
Transfer pricing is a well-known taxation issue and most MNE in the world 
use it. Just a couple of decades ago it was a term mainly used by a few 
international taxation specialists. NGOs and IGOs took it to a public debate 
when realising that this method was a way for MNE to choose when they 
were deciding where they wished to report their profit. The transfer of 
profits, via transfer pricing, has a great impact on the taxable income in each 
state where the MNE is operating. Different tax rates lead to jurisdictional 
conflicts when two states claimed taxation right over a MNE that had 
transferred profit from the high tax state to the low tax state.40  
    
The problematic issue arises when MNE use this pricing mechanism to 
manipulate the price charged on intra-group cross-border transaction to 
avoid taxation. The effect of a manipulated TP is that it produces a 
disproportionally taxable income in the state with lower corporate 
taxation.41 Transfer pricing manipulation – is the correct term when MNE 
over- or under-invoicing goods to avoid taxation in a state. They can put a 
lower price, under-invoicing, to avoid a value-added tax (VAT)42. Transfer 
pricing is necessary for MNE’s internal resource allocation, but it is the 
manipulations of these prices that complicate the taxation issue. 43    
    
                                                
38 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 597 
39 OECD, “About Transfer Pricing” 
40 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 598 
41 Gupta, S ”’Transfer pricing’ – an international taxation issue…” p. 40-41 
42 VAT, is a form of consumption tax imposed on the time of the transaction. Tax rate is 
levied on the purchase price. See ‘Economy Watch’ 
43 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 594 
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When subsidiaries within the same MNE exchange goods it is referred to as 
a “controlled transaction”. It means that the transaction is not subject to the 
same market forces as if the companies were not connected to each other.44 
Already in 1985 Eden argued that TP is the result of differences in corporate 
income taxation and noted that MNE sees the differences as “exogenous 
market imperfections that can be arbitraged through tax avoidance 
strategies”45. 
2.3.1 Transfer Pricing Mechanisms 
When deciding on a transfer price, the price has to be within ‘arm’s length’, 
i.e. the same price that would have been set between two independent 
enterprises. First of all the MNE must find a comparable asset whose selling 
price can be used as a pricing indicator for the company. Two different 
methods can be used when searching for an asset that will help the MNE to 
set their transfer price. The first method is called “external comparable” and 
the arm’s length price is found when two parties, completely unrelated to 
the MNE, sets a price on a transaction similar to the internal transaction in 
question.46 The second type is called “internal comparable” and use the 
price set on a similar asset by a unit within the MNE and an unrelated party. 
The price, already accepted by the MNE once, can later be used as an 
indicator on an internal transaction under comparable circumstances. It can 
be difficult to find an external comparable asset and then the MNE can turn 
to the pricing they found acceptable when trading with a third party in a 
previous situation. Once an internal or external asset has been identified the 
MNE will use a TP method to establish the price.  
    
The OECD-states have since the mid-1990s gradually been accepting 
different TP mechanisms. These mechanisms are different ways a MNE can 
choose when pricing their internal transactions. When these mechanisms 
spread and become more accepted, it becomes easier for tax authorities to 
know what to look for when searching for a mispriced asset. The 
mechanisms can be divided into two main categories, transaction- and 
transactional-profit-based mechanisms, each with its own subcategories. 
                                                
44 OECD, “About Transfer Pricing” 
45 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 592 
46 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 603 
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2.3.1.1 Transaction-based methods 
The transaction-based method is considered to be the ‘old’ or ‘traditional’ 
mechanism since it focuses on finding a price on the asset that shall be 
transferred. This method is divided into three subcategories.47 
    
The comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) is the first and oldest 
subcategory. CUP is based on finding a comparable product purchased by 
unrelated companies that the MNE then can use to price their own asset 
when doing a transaction internally. CUP focuses on comparing the 
products sold under similar circumstances. Sometime there are not any 
comparable products available or they are not being sold under similar 
circumstances so the CUP method cannot be used. Then MNE can use two 
other methods within the transaction-based method.48 
    
The resale price method (RPM) focus on finding a comparable company 
that is in its function comparable to the combined “buyer” and “seller-unit” 
of the MNE. The basic idea is that if comparable companies have similar 
function, they also have similar margins (returns). The MNE gets the 
transfer price by reducing a ‘resale price margin’ from the given retail price 
sold to third party. This gives the ‘buyer-unit’ of the MNE the arm’s length 
return, while the ‘seller-unit’ of the MNE only gets its costs covered. Since 
this transfer price is one-sided and only based on the return the buyer will 
get, all excess profit will go to the manufacturer and the method has often a 
tendency overestimating the transfer price.49  
 
 
     TP € 75   (Margin 25 %) Price €100 
Given resale price € 100 
Resale price margin (25%) -€ 25 à Arm’s Length return 
Transfer Price  € 75 
    
The cost plus method (C+) is the second functional comparable method. 
This method focuses on the suppliers’ side of the transfer. First, the cost of 
production is determined and compared to similar manufacturers’ 
                                                
47 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 604 
48 OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 24 also King, Elisabeth ”Transfer Pricing 
and Corporate Taxation”, p. 22-23 
49 OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 25-26 also King, Elisabeth ”Transfer Pricing 
and Corporate Taxation” p. 17-20 
MNE ‘seller-unit’ MNE ‘buyer-unit’ Independent Enterprise 
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production set-up. A small profit, estimated from similar manufactures’ 
profit, is added to get to the transfer price paid by the buyer-unit. The 
method is also a one-sided method that will give all unallocated profit to the 
buyer-unit and therefore tends to underestimate the price. 50 
2.3.1.2 Transactional-Profit-based methods 
Until 1995 it was only the traditional transaction-based method that was 
accepted by the OECD-states. The lack of arm’s length comparables led to 
that MNE started to use other methods when pricing their assets. When 
pricing intellectual property there were not any comparable goods to 
compare with and no manufactures existed so the transaction-based method 
became useless. American companies started to transfer intellectual property 
to subsidiaries in other countries to keep the income untaxed by the 
American government. This resulted in two different pricing methods that 
focus on the profit being made.51  
    
The American tax authority introduced the comparable profit method 
(CPM) in 1992. In 1995 the OECD made some small modifications to the 
method and named it the transnational net margin method (TNMM). The 
basic idea is the same and focus on comparing the overall result with a 
company preforming the same type of business. The difference between the 
two models is that CPM is based on finding a comparable enterprise and 
then finding a transaction that is comparable to the MNE’s internal 
transaction. TNMM focus directly on finding a comparable transaction.52  
    
The profit split method (PSM) does not focus on comparing transaction with 
other enterprises. Instead, the idea is that the profit shall be divided between 
the units of an internal transaction.  There are different ways on how to 
decide on the size of each share. This method was criticised as not taking 
external nor internal comparables into account. The comparable part of 
finding a transfer price is the foundation of the arm’s length standard.53 The 
method can either be used via ‘residual analysis’ or ‘contribution analysis’. 
The residual analysis is divided into two steps. The first step allocates 
                                                
50 OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 29-30 
51 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 608 
52 OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 33-35 also King, Elisabeth ”Transfer Pricing 
and Corporate Taxation” p. 11-15 
53 OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 43-44 
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compensation for non-unique cost that each part contributed with in this 
controlled transaction. In the second step is to allocate the profit based on an 
analysis of the contribution of each part. The other method referred to as 
contribution analysis divide the profit between the parties based on an 
approximation of what independent enterprises would have expected to 
receive in a similar transaction.54  
  
Source; 55 
2.4 Cases 
This section contains presentation of three tax avoidance cases. The 
’Starbucks’-case and the ‘Amazon’-case both deal with developed states 
that have transparent tax systems. The third case concerns the British food 
company, Associated British Foods’ subsidiary in Zambia, Zambia Sugar 
Plc. Zambia moved from being classified as a low-income to a lower-
middle-income state last year. It should be noted that that this classification 
is not based on the increased income of the population but the state’s overall 
increased income.56 Tax avoidance is better documented in the developed 
                                                
54 OECD, “Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 46 also King, Elisabeth ”Transfer Pricing 
and Corporate Taxation” p. 29-31 
55 Tax Consultants International 
56 ActionAid, ”Sweet Nothings” p. 1 
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states, but there is no reason to believe that it is less widespread in the 
developing world only because the lack of documentation.57 
2.4.1 Starbucks 
In October 2012 Reuters published a special report on Starbucks Coffee 
Company group’s taxation in the United Kingdom. The company has been 
under scrutiny since Reuters published the article but there has never been 
any suggestion that Starbucks has violated any laws or used any illegal 
methods. The article resulted in customers protesting and demanding 
countermeasures by the tax authority.  
    
The article sheds light on the complicated situation where a MNE has the 
possibility to use legal mechanisms to avoid taxation in the state where the 
gross margin is being made. For the last 15 years that Starbucks has been in 
the United Kingdom they have opened more than 735 outlets and sold 
coffee for more that 3 billion pounds, but only paid 8,6 millions pounds in 
tax in the United Kingdom. These numbers alerted Reuters and therefore 
they decided to examine how this was possible and where the regulatory 
gaps are.   
    
Starbucks has used three main activities to combined create a slightly higher 
inter-price than necessary and this made it possible for the subsidiary to 
become a more or less a non-profitable company in the United Kingdom.  
    
The first method used by Starbucks is by using royalties on intellectual 
property. The brand and the business process are categorized as ‘intellectual 
property’ and owned by Starbucks Coffee EMEA BV situated in Amsterdam. 
By charging its subsidiaries a royalty fee of six percent of total sales, they 
reduced the taxable income in the United Kingdom. To be able to deduct 
these fees in the United Kingdom Starbucks had to show that the price were 
set at ‘arm’s length’. According to Stella Amiss, tax partner with 
accountancy firm PwC, a MNE can charge its subsidiaries a royalty-fee of 
six percent if they can show it is essential for the subsidiaries profitability. 
Since the subsidiaries have reported losses each year, she believes this 
percentage might be considered too high.  
    
                                                
57 ActionAid, ”Sweet Nothings” p. 2 
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The second method Starbucks used to move profits was through the transfer 
price on coffee beans. A Switzerland-based subsidiary buy the coffee beans 
that subsequently are bought and used by units in the United Kingdom. 
Before the beans reach the United Kingdom, they pass through another 
Starbucks subsidiary in Amsterdam that roasts the beans before they are 
finally moved on to the subsidiaries. This process makes the beans very 
expensive for the Starbucks units. How much the beans cost when they 
bought from the Swiss-based subsidiary is not known, but it is clear that the 
Dutch unit only reported a profit that reflected one percent of total annual 
turnover. During this period the Netherlands and the United Kingdom had 
25 respectively 24 percent corporate taxation on reported profits. Meanwhile 
Switzerland had a tax rate as low as five percent on profits linked to 
international trade.   
    
A third way of cutting taxation responsibility was made via inter-company 
loans. This is a common technique to transfer money since it brings double 
tax benefits for MNE. The subsidiaries that borrow money to start a new 
Starbucks unit are allowed to deduct the interest they pay against any 
taxable income. The unit that lends out the money is then situated in a state 
that does not tax interest income. Starbucks does not give their subsidiaries 
beneficial interest rates, but the higher interest the subsidiaries have to pay, 
the larger amount of profit can be deducted against the profit to avoid 
taxations.58  
2.4.2 Amazon 
As a follow up to Reuters’ inspection of Starbucks, they published a special 
report on the international book-selling company Amazon.  
    
Amazon is an online retailer that chose to establish the logistic headquarter 
in Luxemburg in 2005. This arrangement resulted in that 25 of Amazon 
units situated in six European states, deprived tax authorities of tax 
revenues. Via inter-company payments, the MNE transferred profits to 
avoid taxation in both European countries and the United States.  
    
The American company started their first subsidiaries in the United 
Kingdom and Germany in 1998 and in France in 2000. In the beginning, the 
                                                
58 Reuters, ”Special Report: How Starbucks avoids UK taxes” 
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units’ worked independently and not even negations with suppliers were 
made with a combined effort.  
    
The unit in the United Kingdom changed their principal activity from 
“marketing and selling of books via the Internet” to “provision of services to 
other group undertakings” and the consumers buying books on 
amazon.co.uk where now doing business with the American units based in 
Delaware. The European units became ‘fulfilment units’ that only 
distributed packages and handled customer services and the profits were 
shifted to the American unit. The American unit on the other hand had 
reported losses since 1995 and the European profits was put against these 
losses. This resulted in Amazon not having to pay any taxes on the overseas 
profits. 
    
In 2003 the American unit started to make more money and profits that were 
brought from the European units was taxed with a high rate. Amazon then 
turned to Luxemburg that offered advantages to the MNE as being part of 
the European Union and also offering low tax rates. At the time, Luxemburg 
had a corporate income tax rate at 29 percent. Under specific conditions did 
the tax authority exempt 80 percent of the income earned through 
intellectual property from taxation. This resulted to the effective tax rate for 
Amazon dropped to below six percent.  
    
In 2004 Amazon shifted some of its operations in the United States to 
Luxemburg where they established three units. The first, Amazon Services 
Europe SARL, controlled the contract with third parties and was liable for 
taxation. The second, Amazon Europe Holding Technologies, purpose was 
“to acquire (…) any intellectual property rights, patents, and trademarks 
licenses and generally to hold, to license the right to use it solely to one of 
its direct or indirect wholly owned subsidiaries”. This company was a type 
of limited partnership that is exempt from income taxes in Luxemburg. The 
third company, Amazon EU SARL, was to become the supplier of goods 
and services within Europe and liable for tax. 
    
Amazon EU SARL then paid a fee to Amazon Europe Holding 
Technologies for the use of Amazon technology. The only problem was the 
fact that Amazon Europe Holding Technologies did not have a technology 
to license out, since Amazon Technologies Inc. in Nevada owned this right. 
The inter-company deal that solved this issue has not been made public yet. 
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Company accounts show that Amazon Europe Holding Technologies 
received up to 583 million euros from the European subsidiaries, while 
paying Amazon Technologies Inc. 230 million euros each year.  
    
Since 2005 Amazon Europe Holding Technologies has started to lend 
money to Amazon EU SARL in order to fund international expansion. The 
received interest on the loans has been estimated to 45 million euros and 
income of interest stays untaxed in Luxemburg. 
    
In October 2011 Amazon revealed that the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
has demanded 1.5 billion dollars for unpaid taxes. Neither part has disclosed 
the reason for the demand but Amazon referred to the charges being linked 
to “transfer pricing with our foreign subsidiaries since 2005”.59  
2.4.3 Zambia Sugar 
In February 2013 the non-governmental organisation ActionAid published a 
report of how the British-owned food-company, the Associated British 
Foods group (ABF), effectively avoided taxation through tax havens and tax 
concessions awarded by governments. ABF is one of the world’s largest 
multinational food companies that own brands such as Twinings, Silver 
Spoon sugar and Kingsmill bread. This report focused on the Zambian 
subsidiary, Zambia Sugar Plc. 
    
ABF acquired Illovo sugar group and in 2007 ABF launched the subsidiary 
Zambia Sugar Plc. According to ActionAid’s calculations Zambia has lost 
approximately $ 17.7 millions in tax revenue since then. This has been done 
through financial engineering and payments into tax haven sister companies 
in Ireland and Mauritius. Even though the corporate tax level is 35 percent 
in Zambia, Zambia Sugar Plc. has managed to only pay 0.5 percent of its 
profits since 2007 and during the period from 2008 to 2010 not any tax at 
all. To make this possible ActionAid recognised four different strategies to 
remove taxable profit in Zambia.  
    
Firstly, Zambia Sugar has paid its sister company in Ireland large amounts 
for ‘purchasing and management’-fees and similar payments for ‘export 
agency’-fees to its sister company in Mauritius. Not any of the two sister 
                                                
59 Reuters, ”Special Report: Amazon’s billion-dollar tax shield” 
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companies have any permanent employees at the offices and which services 
Zambia Sugar gets in return for their payments is still unclear.  
    
Secondly, Zambia Sugar has loaned money from South African and US 
commercial banks to expand the sugar industry in southern Zambia. Zambia 
Sugar makes their payment through a bank account held by an Irish 
company even if there is a possibility to make direct payment to the bank. 
This way of doing business is sometimes referred to as ‘Treaty shopping’. 
The company take advantage of the treaty that exists between Zambia and 
Ireland that prevents the tax authority to impose tax rate on interest 
payments of loans.  
    
Thirdly, Zambia Sugar shift profits to the parent company, almost tax-free, 
through a range of holding companies in Ireland, Mauritius and the 
Netherlands. When ABF reallocated the ownership of Zambia Sugar into 
holding companies in these states, they use tax treaty loopholes and the tax 
haven state that do not tax dividend payments.  
    
Fourthly, Zambia Sugar has been able to exploit two different tax breaks 
given by the Zambian government. In 2007 the company took the Zambian 
Revenue Authority to court and got the right to classify their profits as 
‘farming income’. Three-quarters of their income originates from industrial 
sugar manufacture, but by being allowed to classify it all as ‘farming 
income’ they were allowed to reduce their tax rate from 35 percent to 15 
percent. In 2012 the Zambian government reduced the farming tax to 10 
percent, which gave Zambian Sugar even further tax relief. The other tax 
relief enjoyed by Zambian Sugar regard the expansion of factories. The 
Zambian Revenue Authority granted tax breaks for cost when expanding 
factories in Zambia to attract foreign investment.60  
    
None of these actions are illegal in any state and Zambian Sugar has merely 
used the system being presented to them on the cost of citizens of Zambia.  
2.5 Analysis   
First of all one have to bear in mind that the problems associated with 
transfer pricing are relatively ‘good’ problems. The mere fact that MNEs 
                                                
60 ActionAid, ”Sweet Nothings” p. 1-4 
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contribute to the circulation of money results in that more individuals can 
use them and this is beneficial for both the community and the state. By 
using TP the MNEs do not hide assets through tax evasion but rather 
respects that tax should be paid. The problems that arise are not based on 
violation of human rights or national legislation, but on the MNEs choice to 
put their own interest above the states’. At a first glance the MNEs way of 
acting are not considered to be problematic since it should be within 
everyone’s right to act for their own benefit. The problem, however, arises 
when MNEs try to prevent states to carry out its right to demand tax 
revenues. The fact that the benefits of MNEs’ presence outweigh the 
disadvantages might be one of the reasons why states are not complaining 
more. 
    
When MNEs reallocate assets, transfer pricing is a necessary tool to use in 
order to make a ‘fair’ distribution of profit. The MNEs, and not an objective 
organ, set the transfer price and it gives them a freedom to decide where 
they wish to report their profit. Tax authorities then examine if the transfer 
price is within ALP. If an objective organ were to determine the price from 
the start, states would perhaps get a more accurate pricing to evaluate.   
    
The TP principle worked fairly well when mainly material assets where 
transferred between units. It ensured that the workers got paid and the 
developing state got some share of the profit. Today “new non-materials” 
assets enter the international market and MNE faces difficulties when 
pricing them.  Non-materials such as intellectual property, loans, service and 
management do not have a fixed and defined price and comparable assets 
are hard to find. When ‘new’ resources enter the market, new methods to 
find ALP are developed. More methods increases the possibility for MNEs 
to manipulate a method and find a transfer price within ALP concept that is 
suitable for them.  
    
By overestimating non-material assets MNEs can transfer profits to a 
subsidiary situated in a state with low corporate tax without the risk to 
violate any regulation. We could see in the Starbucks and Amazon cases 
how easy and openly they transferred profits between some of the more 
elaborated legal system in the world without any difficulty. 
    
Developing and developed states both need MNEs to continue their 
economic growth, but both lose out on revenues when MNEs transfer 
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profits. Even if states are equal in a legal sense, they do not have equal 
possibility to implement regulation. There are difficulties for 
implementations, especially for developing states that lack experience in 
order to carry out an effective tax administration. 
    
Developed states do not need MNEs to the same extent as developing states 
and therefore are they in a better position when negotiating with MNEs for a 
fair taxation. The competition between states also affects developing states 
more since they have problems in obtaining comparable information from 
others states in similar situations. Only the MNE knows the offered tax rates 
offered by other states and the negotiating state becomes the underdog. One 
cannot blame the MNE for wanting a better position, one rather has to go 
back and reflect on why they have been given this freedom in the first place. 
    
The main problem is that MNEs are allowed to control where they wish to 
report their profit. It results in that the MNE gets the ability to offer states 
small taxable profits if given low tax rates, which is of course better than 
nothing. When given the freedom to negotiate with states, MNEs have 
created a competitive situation for states that forces the states to lower their 
tax rates.  
    
When limiting the regulation to ALP, states also limit the possibility to 
regulate the company outside the principle. Every MNE have the same 
possibility as Amazon, Starbucks and Zambia Sugar to transfer profits to 
low tax states, but not every MNE chooses to avoid taxes. The ALP is not 
an obstacle for MNEs who wishes to avoid taxation and it is rather to be 
considered as a tool to set a fair transfer price, not a mechanism to control 
the transfer of profit. 
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3 International recognition of 
Transfer Pricing 
3.1 International Tax regime 
According to Professor Lorraine Eden there are three parts that have been 
important in the development process of international taxation and she 
predicts that they also will be important for the future development.61 The 
first part is globalisation that helps MNE to function throughout the world. 
The globalisation is difficult to control and both MNE and states need to 
adapt to this fast growing development. The second driving force is, 
according to Eden, Internet. It creates the possibility for consumers in one 
state to buy goods from a company in a second state that in turn store its 
goods in a third state. This can even be done without external costs or time-
consuming processes. The third part she recognises as a driving force in 
international taxation is regionalisation. Both the European Union (EU) and 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) want to strengthen the 
MNEs since they are necessary for the regions development. To strengthen 
the MNEs position the MNEs need a clear regulatory framework so they 
know what is expected of them. It is important to get the regions to develop 
regulations for guidance otherwise the international disputes might 
increase.62  
     
To get national tax regulations cohesive with other states regulation it is 
important to have a transparent tax system without loopholes. One step 
towards cohesive tax regulations for states and regional organisations is to 
adopt guidance from international organisations. A useful international tax 
regime provides regulations for behaviour, presents information on the 
international market, formalises dispute settlement mechanisms and set out 
principles, implicit or explicit, that various actors’ expectations are jointed 
around.63 
    
                                                
61 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 615 
62 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 615 
63 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 598 
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The regime today is a combination of bilateral tax treaties (BTT), guidelines 
by the OECD and the UN. Many of states that are part of OECD have 
signed BTTs on tax bases64, transfer pricing mechanisms and how to handle 
international dispute settlements procedures. OECD has played an important 
role when it relates to the development of cohesion of national tax 
legislations even though their guidelines are of course not legally binding 
for the states.  
3.1.1 Connection to the State 
OECD suggests that states with a connection, referred to as nexus, to the 
MNE should have a right to demand tax revenues from the MNE. This 
principle differs from the more common source and residence principles 
used to tax individuals. The source principle states that a country has the 
right to tax a company if the income has arisen within the states jurisdiction. 
Each establishment is looked upon as an individual legal entity with 
individual profit and taxed without considerations towards the parent 
company. Other states use the residence principle that gives them the right 
to tax entities that have a permanent residence in the jurisdiction. The 
interpretations vary and some states consider a company as residence if any 
part of the company is incorporated in the jurisdiction, while others 
determine company-residence as where the ‘location of management’ is 
seated. If a state adapts the residence principle they can either tax domestic 
income, worldwide income or a combination of the two. Depending on 
which method is used by the states, there is a direct risk that the use of 
different principles in different states will result in double taxation for the 
MNEs income. 65 
    
The OECD guideline suggests a combination of the two principles where 
the ‘source nation’ has the primary right to tax profit while the ‘residence 
nation’ has the primary right to tax other kinds of income. Since the 
residence nation tax the MNE after the source nation, they also have the 
responsibility to remove any regulation that would lead to double taxation of 
the MNE. Deduce the tax for the MNE’s ‘foreign income taxes’ is a 
common way to get around the problem of double taxation. This results in 
almost every OECD-state using the same method; each state first tax the 
                                                
64 Tax base, the measure made of assets used to determine tax liability. See ‘Accounting 
Tools’  
65 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 600 
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domestic source income for non-residents and then the worldwide income 
for resident.66  
3.2 Transfer Pricing Guidelines 
Within the international tax regime it is the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) that has taken on the responsibility to 
develop guidance for TP. The OECD council approved the first general 
guideline for multinationals in 1976 and the first specific TP guidance in 
1995. The area is quickly changing and in 2005 the committee of Fiscal 
Affairs (CFA) of the OECD started an undertaking to develop the specific 
guidance for MNEs and governments on how to handle TP.  The business 
community that participated in a public invitation for commentators67 and 
the ‘business advisory group’ warmly greeted this action. OECD also 
released a discussion draft that contained contributions by variety 
organisations and OECD considered these when developing the guidance.68 
Already in 1979 OECD published a summary on inputs given by MNE on 
the first guidelines.  
    
Since OECD and UN are not geographically limited their guidelines etc. on 
transfer pricing has generated much international attention. It is should be 
noted that regional bodies such as EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum (EU 
JTPF)69, Inter-American Centre of Tax Administration (CIAT)70, African 
Tax Administration Forum (ATAF)71 and the Study Group on Asian Tax 
Administration and Research (SGATAR) are all focusing on the TP-issue 
and developing internal guidelines for their region. Both the regional 
organisations and the UN are using OECD guidelines as basis when 
developing guidelines and on the 22nd of July 2010, the OECD council 
approved the new and improved ‘Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax administrations’ (TPG). TPG is a 
                                                
66 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 600 
67 OECD, ”Public invitation for Commentators”   
68 OECD, ”About Transfer Pricing” 
69 EU Joint Transfer Pricing Forum 
70 Inter-American Center of Tax Administrations   
71 African Tax Administration Forum 
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composition of methods and analysis that can be used by MNEs and 
authorities when determining the arm’s length principle.72  
    
The OECD Committee on Fiscal Affairs has been the developer of these 
guidelines. CFA is a combination of senior tax officials from OECDs 
member states where a majority comes from the United States. The 
guidelines have therefore been influenced by the American taxation system, 
which can create contradictions when applied in legal systems that are not 
similar to the American system.73  
3.2.1 Business inputs for the future 
OECD published their first report on transfer pricing for multinationals in 
1979. The critique of the first publication mainly concerned the taxation 
effects on shared costs within the MNE. The critics claimed that this might 
influence the MNEs future international investments. The critique was 
analysed by CFA and summarized in three categories that OECD was 
recommended to take into consideration. The critique had a strong impact 
on the development on existing guidelines.74 If all of these concerns had 
been met at that time, some of the issues faced today might not have been as 
problematic as they are. 
    
Firstly, the business community did not want there to be any difference in 
the evaluations performed by tax authorities in various states. For instance if 
the cost for a company car for an employee is considered to be a deductible 
cost from the company’s taxable income in one state but not in another 
state, this might this be influential when deciding on where to invest. It is 
therefore important that every cost is treated equal in every state so the 
incentive to transfer a cost from one subsidiary to another disappears. If the 
evaluations of tax costs differ between states, it will be more difficult for 
MNE to establish foreign subsidiaries since they have to be aware of the tax 
regulation before establishment.75 The OECD answered this critique by 
saying that in principle there are no differences and therefore it will not be 
considered as an obstacle for the MNE when establishing new 
                                                
72 OECD, ”About Transfer Pricing”  
73 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 599 
74 CFA, ”Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises” p. 90 
75 CFA, ”Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises” p. 90 
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subsidiaries.76 It has not become a substantial obstacle, but since no effort 
was made to reduce the differences of evaluating costs, MNE have turned it 
into a loophole. In all three cases presented above, we can note that lending 
subsidiaries are placed in states where income on interest is not being taxed.   
    
Secondly, the MNE emphasised that the tax authority’s responsibility 
should not be to question and investigate the distribution of the MNE 
resources. Their focus should be to evaluate the recourses that are within the 
authorities jurisdiction and not evaluate why the MNE has chosen to 
establish a subsidiary with certain functioning within the jurisdiction. This 
would not be questionable if it was a domestic company and should 
therefore not be an issue of discrimination for foreign companies.77 The 
matter of discrimination was more of an issue some decades ago when 
foreign companies had difficulties to establish in some states. If a state had 
the possibility/obligation to evaluate the reason for establishment in their 
state today, the MNEs would not be able establish ‘shell-companies’ that 
only contain a bank account for tax purposes.     
    
Thirdly, the business community expressed that common costs for the MNE 
group should be deductible in one of the states when calculating taxable 
profit since this would eliminate the risk of double taxation. OECD did 
however not believe that the problem of double taxation would disappear if 
one makes the group cost deducible in one state. OECD replied that 
unifying taxation into an international system would be too complicated 
since it would include combining national taxation systems.78 To make cost 
contributions deducible worldwide might have been too complicated and the 
analysis done by OECD in 1979 was probably correct. We have however 
seen regional suggestions on this matter reappear in the last decade.79 
Perhaps such a regulation should first be on regional level for administrative 
reasons.  
                                                
76 CFA, ”Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises” p. 91 
77 CFA, ”Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises” p. 91 
78 CFA, ”Transfer Pricing and Multinational Enterprises” p. 93 
79 COM (2006) 824 
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3.3 Control Transfer Pricing  
How to handle the issues concerning TP is an on-going debate and it is 
difficult to find a single method that would be functional worldwide and on 
any type of asset. The widely accepted principle of ‘Arm’s length price’ is 
not perfect and some alternative methods are being promoted. These 
methods have however not been met without criticism and so far the arm’s 
length principle is still the method used to decide on the transfer price, and 
in the foreseeable future, will be the base for taxation.  
3.3.1 Issues of taxing Arm’s Length Price 
Article 9 of OECD’s ‘Articles of Model Convention with respect to taxes on 
income and on capital’80 is considered to be the basis for all bilateral 
agreements and treaties to avoid double taxation. Paragraph 1 is the 
foundation for the arm’s length price (ALP). As part of OECD Model 
Convention this article is applicable to all OECD member states. Many 
MNEs are based in OECD member sates. The article got a broader impact 
when the United Nations (UN) adopted the article into United Nations’ 
‘Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries’, which made it applicable in all UN member states.81 The ALP is 
the most important principle used today to solve the problems that comes as 
a result of TP.82 
    
The arm’s length principle requires that two related parties set the same 
price on an asset being transferred internally as the price being set on a 
similar asset between two unrelated companies. The approach to treat the 
entities of the MNE as two independent enterprises aims to give attention to 
the conditions of the transaction and not to the parties performing it.83 The 
two entities are treated as two separate companies for tax purposes and this 
should be reflected in their transactions.84 
    
                                                
80 Supplement A 
81 Supplement A 
82 Gupta, Sayantan, ”’Transfer pricing’ – an international issue…” p. 43 
83 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 5 
84 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 602 
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The main reason to use ALP is that it provides equality between units within 
a MNE and independent enterprises in the same state. If both the unit and 
the independent enterprise receive equal profit, when trading with foreign 
parties, both will be obliged to pay the same amount of tax and the 
companies will be on an equal level.85 ALP have been used for a long time 
and has shown to be applicable in any tax system and on a vide range of 
assets. There have however been situations e.g. on certain highly specialised 
goods where the principle has shown to be complicated to apply. OECD has 
accepted various methods, such as the transactional profit split methods 
described in section 2.2.1.2, as guidance in those situations.86 
3.3.1.1 Critique of ALP 
During development of ALP the business community has become more 
global and specialized and different methods have been accepted to 
determine the transfer price for all various types of businesses. It has been 
necessary to make ALP applicable on a wide variety of assets, but when 
accepting all different methods, they have also opened up the possibility for 
MNE to choose which method they find the most suitable for their 
transaction. The transaction-based method and the profit-based method are 
easy to manipulate into wished pricing.87 
    
The tax authorities tend not to evaluate the MNE’s TP as if independent 
parties would have used that method, but merely evaluate if the 
documentation provided by the MNE is acceptable. The difficulty to find a 
comparable transaction in practice makes it hard for the tax authorities to 
determine a price at arm’s length and it increases the risk that MNE 
manipulated the pricing into a whished pricing.  
    
One of the biggest concerns when using ALP is to obtain information of 
similar transactions. Tax administrations can have difficulties collecting 
enough data on transactions between independent enterprises. This can be 
because of confidentiality reasons or lack of data on previous transactions.88 
Even if finding a similar transaction there is no guarantee that the set 
transfer price represents the value of the asset or the subsidiary’s 
                                                
85 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 6 section 1.8 
86 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 6 section 1.9 
87 Rugmand, Alan  & Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 614 
88 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 6-7 section 1.13 
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contribution of the transaction. It only proves that this transfer price was 
accepted before. No objective opinion is given on what represents a ‘fair’ 
price. The fact that two companies agree upon a price does not necessarily 
make it representative for the asset’s value in the company. 
3.3.2 Advanced pricing agreements 
An Advanced Pricing Agreement (APA) is an agreement extending over 
several years, between the taxpaying MNE and one or more taxation 
authorities. The parties agree on the tax criteria, such as method, comparable 
assets and critical assumptions for the years to come and this agreement, 
shall determine the taxation of internal transfers for the MNE.89 The APA 
should be a complement to the ALP and the criteria agreed upon should be 
based on the principle. The aim is to provide a proactive and cooperative 
method to resolve transfer-pricing disputes. An APA eliminates uncertainty 
and reduces the cost associated with document preparation and transfer 
inspection for the tax authority.90  
    
It is hard for the tax administration to make a fair judgement on what is 
arm’s lengths pricing and this alternative regulation to ALP offers an 
agreement where MNEs and states can agree on terms that satisfy both 
parties. States are however sometimes hesitant to sign these agreement since 
they are binding for some years to come. MNE have the upper hand when it 
comes to estimating how the unit in the state will develop in the future. If 
the tax authority disagrees with the APA after a couple of years, there is 
very little flexibility to change the taxation.91 In some states are MNEs 
obliged to report any APAs they have signed to the tax authority and in 
some states does the authority publish the APAs they have signed with 
MNEs.92  
    
APAs are well used in the business world but it is not a complete alternative 
to ALP since the agreement is built on the principle and estimations of the 
future ALP is done. 
                                                
89 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 135 section 4.123 
90 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 173 section 4.142-4.144 
91 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 174 section 4.148 
92 IRS ”Announcement and Report concerning Advanced Pricing Agreements” 
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3.3.3 Global formulary apportionment  
In its Transfer Pricing Guidelines the OECD presents an alternative taxation 
method when taxing MNE called the “Global formulary apportionment” 
(GFA). This method focuses on determining a proper level of profit in each 
jurisdiction where the MNE is active through a subsidiary. A predetermined 
and mechanistic formula would allocate the global profit to the various 
jurisdictions of the MNE.93 MNE shall, according to this method of 
taxation, calculate each unit’s share of a certain factor as a percentage of the 
worldwide sum of the same factor existing in the MNE. This percentage 
shall then be taken of the global profit made by the MNE that year and 
referred to as that unit’s taxable profit in the jurisdiction where the unit is 
situated. Three requirements are necessary for this method to work.  First of 
all the boundaries for the MNE needs to be determined and which units shall 
be taxed. Secondly, an estimation of the global profit needs to be made. 
Finally, there is a need to establish a formula that will determine how the 
global profit will be allocated between each unit.94 
   
Advocates for this method claim that it would simplify the taxation process 
for the taxpayers since the authorities would no longer have to collect 
documentation on transfer pricing when reallocating assets. This formula 
would consider the MNE on a group-wide bases and the assets would be 
valued so they reflect the economic value in reality. It is, however, hard to 
separate out units from highly integrated groups when determining the  units 
share of the MNE’s groups profit as is done today with these separate 
accounting method in ALP.95  
     
However, even if some regional taxing jurisdictions have attempted this 
approach it has not been given any international recognition by the OECD 
states. The method is criticised for being too complicated to implement in 
practice. There is no implementation method that would ensure single 
taxations at the same time as it gives protection for double taxation. The 
operation also requires an unrealistic level of cooperation between states 
that do not exist today. States would have disagreements on factors that 
                                                
93 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 7 section 1.16-1.17 
94 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 7 section 1.17 also Rugmand, Alan  & 
Brewer, Thomas ”Oxford handbook of International Business” p. 614  
95 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 8 section 1.19 
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determine the local units share. The critics claim this would create an 
incentive for states to create formulas that would give them maximized 
revenue to the state.96  
    
A third critique is the concern that these predetermined formulas are not 
being cohesive with the market conditions and the MNE allocation of assets 
and profit might lack realistic interaction with the international market 
which will damage the individual unit of the MNE.97  
    
OECD summarised the critique and states that the formula cannot 
“recognize important geographical differences, separate company 
efficiencies and other factors (…) in determining the division of profits 
between enterprises in different tax jurisdictions.”98  
    
There are difficulties with the implementation and a high level of 
cooperation is necessary. Today states have no incitement to cooperate, but 
one shall not underestimate states willingness to cooperate if if the result 
might be to increase revenues. If a specific tax rate is offered to a MNE, 
competing states can offer a more advantageous level for the company. As 
long as there is a situation where MNE are given the opportunity to create a 
situation where states are in competition, there will be an unwillingness to 
cooperate. This method would guarantee a situation where MNE cannot in a 
legal manner avoid taxation and the revenue would increase.    
3.4 Analysis 
The international recognition of TP issues consists of both agreements and 
guidelines. A BTT targets both MNEs and states when establishing 
specified conditions between the states. The international regime focuses in 
general on how TP shall function seen from an objective point of view and 
not on an agreement between specific parties.  
 
OECD is a neutral organisation that does not focus their guidelines on a 
specific state or on a company. In the beginning, OECD paid more attention 
to states’ rights and showed almost no interest in the MNEs’ rights and 
                                                
96 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 8-9 section 1.21-1.24 
97 OECD, ”Transfer Pricing Guidelines…” p. 9 section 1.25 
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functioning. During the development process of TPG OECD improved the 
exchange of information with the MNEs and asked for their point of view. It 
is crucial to consider both parts opinion if OECD wishes to reach a 
sustainable TP concept. If prioritising one part over the other a one-sided 
relationship might appear. It is not recommended to create a one-sided 
relationship when both parts need each other and each need should be 
priority for the other part. States can offer more transparent systems for 
MNE and also offer them information needed to develop their company. 
MNE on the other hand can offer tax revenues and job opportunities. 
   
OECD has started to define major problems with ALP and has presented 
alternative methods. ALP is not ideal and it is a time- and cost consuming 
process. The tedious ALP process has shown not to prevent MNEs wishing 
to avoid taxation. APA is not an alternative since the agreement has to be in 
accordance with ALP. APA can be used no matter which regulation method 
that is used, but it is not recommended as the only regulation. The non-
flexible nature of APA makes it complicated for parties if conditions change 
frequently. This method is not the solution for TP issues and will not 
prevent MNE from avoiding taxation. States will also not be in a better 
position when negation with MNEs. APA is not the final solution to the 
problem. 
    
OECD also launched GFA as an alternative solution. Even if this regulation 
would result in a more ‘fair’ division of profits and it would be the states 
that had the upper hand in the negotiations, OECD also presented 
difficulties of implementation that might appear when using this method. 
The main critique is based on the states difficulty to cooperate. Perhaps this 
critique is more of a projection of the problems faced today rather than 
predictions of the implementation of GFA. Today states have little to gain of 
cooperating. If a state use ALP and reveals tax reliefs given to a MNE, other 
states will uses this information when negotiation with the MNE. The MNE 
might be offered a lower tax rate in one of the other states and move from 
the revealing state. If revealing tax rates within GFA stats have noting to 
loose since the MNEs do not determine where they want to pay tax. The 
willingness for states to cooperate might increase if participating in a less 
competitive market. Even though GFA is not likely to rule out ALP it is 
always good to be proactive and try to find solutions on future problems. 
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4 State Responsibilities 
4.1 Transparency of the taxation system 
OECD Secretary-General, Angel Gurria, has said; “As governments and 
their citizens are struggling to make ends meet, it is critical that all tax 
payers – private and corporate – pay their fair amount of taxes and trust the 
international tax system is transparent”. 99 
    
Citizens, private and corporate, rarely want to pay tax but all wish to take 
part in the benefits it brings. It is therefore within the state’s responsibility 
to create a tax system with transparency so that taxpayers know what is 
expected of them. Some states try to handle the issues of transfer pricing on 
their own by broadening the tax base, raising the tax rate on personal 
income or implement VAT on products leaving the state to minimize the tax 
revenue losses.100. The variety of tax regulation in states makes an 
international coordination for transparency very difficult.101 
    
Independent organisations also assist states and MNE to create a more 
transparent system. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is 
developed and overseen by an alliance of governments, investors, NGOs 
and MNEs. The organisation aims to set global standards for revenues 
originating from states’ natural resources and create transparency for both 
states and MNEs. So far 37 states are participating in this initiative by 
EITI.102  
4.1.1 Importance of documentation 
Transparency is important for MNE so they know what is expected of them 
and for tax authorities so they know what they can expect.103 In most states 
it is the tax authorities task to do a satisfactory examination of the MNE 
businesses and determine the taxation level. It is up to the tax authorities to 
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collect all the necessary documentation from the MNE and other parties. If 
the MNE does not cooperate and provide the authorities with requested 
documentation, the burden of documentation will shift to the taxpaying unit. 
They will often be requested to pay a higher tax rate or a fee if they cannot 
provide sufficient documentation.104 In other states the MNE has to disclose 
documentation that show evidence of correctly set transfer prices - even 
without the tax authorities demanding it. Even if the responsibility of 
information gathering shifts in different states, MNE will always be 
responsible for presenting documentation.105   
    
When performing an internal transaction the arm’s length pricing principle 
should be in focus and supported with documents. The documents and data 
used when the MNE sets the transfer price shall be saved for later scrutiny 
by the tax authority. It is not within the tax authority’s responsibility to find 
an arm’s length price and then compare it to the price set by the MNE. The 
tax authorities task is to evaluate whether the price already set is within the 
arm’s length principle.106  When preparing the pricing the MNE shall use 
the “prudent business manage management principle” which means they 
shall prepare documentation in relation to the proportion of the transaction. 
The company have also to present any factor that has been taken into 
account when setting the price.107 In the evaluation by the tax authority they 
have to consider which information was available to the MNE when setting 
their transfer price. 108 
4.1.2 International Guidance for documentation 
The Transfer Pricing Guidelines developed by OECD is referred to by most 
regional organisations. EU wanted to ensure that the requirements of 
documentation are considered by the MNE situated in the EU region so they 
developed the EU Transfer Pricing Documentation (EU TPD). The purpose 
of EU TPD is to provide information to the MNE and the tax 
administrations in the member states.  It is also a guideline on which 
documents are expected from the company and what the administrators shall 
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pay attention to when evaluating the taxation responsibility.109 The creation 
of EU TPD was considered necessary since the national legislations were 
not always cohesive with OECD guidelines and this created confusion for 
middle and smaller MNE entering the international market.110 The EU TPD 
is not only applicable to MNE situated within the region, but rather function 
as a complement to the OECD Guidelines. This guidance is developed as 
optional and will not be implemented via a directive.111  
    
The Pacific Association of Tax Administrations (PATA), consisting of 
Japan, Canada, Australia and the United States, has also developed a 
combined regulation for concerning transfer pricing. This regulation is said 
to be optional and consistent with the OECD Guidelines. The regulation is a 
package of all four members national regulation regarding document 
requirements. Since it meets the national regulations on transfer pricing 
documentation the MNE has to regard it as national legislation and therefore 
in reality not optional.112 There are three functioning principles that make up 
the core of the PATA Documentation Package.  
    
Firstly, the MNE has to try to set a transfer price within the arm’s length 
principle. This means they have to search for comparable transactions that 
are controlled by two separate companies.113  
    
Secondly, the MNE needs to keep all documentation to verify that they have 
taken necessary steps to find a transfer price within the arm’s length 
principle. The national tax authority shall evaluate this documentation when 
deciding on taxation level for that specific MNE. They shall also regard 
other relevant facts like the availability of relevant data and the importance 
and complexity of the issue.114 
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Thirdly, the MNE has an obligation to provide documentation to the 
requesting taxation authority if the transfer involves the jurisdiction of that 
authority.115  
4.2 UN manual for Developing Countries 
With the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines as inspiration, UN has 
published “Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing for Developing 
Countries”. It aims to give a practical guidance for developing states when 
analysing transactions of MNE. It is important that the developing states get 
the information they need to handle tax issues that arises when companies 
do internal transaction. Without information of how to prepare national 
legislation there is a risk profits appear to be earned in a low tax jurisdiction 
instead. 116 
4.2.1 Practical Manual on Transfer Pricing 
As 30 percent of the world trade is between related parties UN has defined 
transfer mispricing as a growing tax issue. Many of the transfers that are 
made between a developing state and a developed state, results often in an 
unfavourable position for the developing state.117   
    
UN gives clear guidance on the documentation that should be demanded 
from the MNE and how to classify different documents that are required. 
Basic enterprise-related documents that give information about the owners 
and includes profiles that estimate the company sales shall be submitted 
when establishing a new corporation. Transaction-specific documents 
unveil information of similar, comparable international transactions and 
provide functional analyses of the enterprise when setting a transfer price. 
Computation-related documents that give detailed information of the reason 
for selecting the price, which method used, factors and assumptions that 
influenced the decision shall also be submitted by a MNE when performing 
an internal transaction.118    
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The guidance aim to give the developing states assistance on how to handle 
these issues, but also to give clear advices on which transfer pricing method 
should be used when transferring different assets. For intangibles with no 
comparables UN suggests the PSM or CUP method in order to find an arm’s 
length price on these assets. When intra-group services are provided 
between subsidiaries the guidance suggest the CUP method if an external 
enterprise could provide the service or C+ method if there are no 
comparables.119  
    
In the manual, UN stresses the fact that TP regimes should be part of 
domestic law. It is of importance that each state formulates or adapts their 
tax regulation so it is cohesive with international tax guidance and TP 
treaties.120 UN do not state how implementation of the regulation should be 
done, but offers suggestions such as Controlled Foreign Corporation (CFC) 
rules or “Safe Harbour rules” to ease the process. CFC rules have been 
developed to prevent MNEs’ use of foreign subsidiaries to avoid taxation. 
The domestic company is taxed on income of subsidiary units profit. States 
are usually not allowed to demand tax by companies established in other 
jurisdictions. This principle is different and if certain specific conditions are 
met, states can be allowed to tax subsidiaries in low tax jurisdiction.121 Safe 
harbour rules exempts profits, that are within a specific range, as percentage 
of overall sales or under a certain amount, from ALP method. Instead the 
profit will be taxed with a specific rate and the MNE do not have to comply 
with the complex and expensive procedure surrounding the arm’s length 
methodology. This type of regulation is a simplified mechanism that UN 
suggests for developing counties mainly because it provides predictability 
and ease for tax administrators. The UN believes safe harbour regulation 
would help in small-cases where there are difficulties to collect information. 
There is always a risk that the collection of analytical data is too extensive. 
The effort made by the tax authority to evaluate is not always in proportion 
to the controlled transaction.122 It should, however, be noted that OECD 
discuss safe harbour regulation in their guidelines but do not suggest it as an 
alternative in developed states. The disadvantages, such as the high risk of 
double taxation, tax avoidance and difficulties to implement mutual 
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agreements, weights heavier than the small amount tax revenues it will 
bring in rich states.123      
    
UN has presented different methods to use when implementing TP 
regulations, regarding approaches and which effects they have on the 
national system. The tax regulation can either refer the burden of proof to 
the authorities or base it on a self-assessment system. The manual presents 
pros and cons of both approaches to help states find a way adapted to their 
system.124  
4.2.2 Challenges in India 
The UN practical manual gives presentations on four individual states: 
Brazil, China, South Africa and India. The presentations, which have been 
written by the states themselves, aim to present their experiences as 
information to readers. They do not represent the view of the UN 
Subcommittee.  
    
India is a big country that offers a large labour force and attracts many 
manufacturing MNEs. They have used the arm’s length principle since 2001 
to control TP issues. India presents a timeline-issue that appears when 
collecting data. Even though the states believe that comparability analysis is 
the key to determine arm’s length price, there are difficulties with the 
market volatility. The international markets volatility complicates and limits 
comparable assets since the price set two years ago is not necessarily the 
price that would have been set today.125  
    
A second issue India faced when implementing ALP was the importance of 
risk assessment. The general consensus, that risk only can be controlled by 
the parent company and subsidiaries in India are exempted from the 
responsibility, is not correct according to the Indian transfer pricing 
administration. They mean the Indian subsidiaries exercise control over 
operational manufacture and other risks. Therefore, India believes 
subsidiaries should have the same right to returns on functions performed, 
including strategic decisions and control on risk related to their operation.126   
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Some complications appears when a state implement ALP and with these 
reports the states help each other towards a more transparent system where 
the roles are set by the states and not by the MNE.  
4.3 Analysis 
The responsibility to control TP issues lies upon the states. Neither states 
nor anyone else can legally demand higher tax revenues or responsibility 
from MNEs than what is legally required. It is within the states right and 
responsibility to legislate on matters within its jurisdiction.  
    
In general, very few want to pay tax, but everyone wants to enjoy the 
benefits. If one company were to be exempted from taxation it would not 
inhibit the development. The governmental budget will not increase because 
one MNE chooses to transfer their profit out of the state. However, if every 
individual would be given the same possibility to transfer taxable income, 
the state would stagnate. Therefore the tax system has to be applicable to 
everyone and MNE should not be an exception. It is within the states 
interest to regulate MNE. States need to create a regulation that is 
transparent so that the MNEs know what is expected of them.   
    
States also need to bear in mind the long-term effects tax avoidance has on 
the development of the state. They need to create a sustainable system 
strong enough for market volatility. MNEs might in the future request 
engineers, economists and other educated workforces. Today developing 
states welcome MNEs’ demand of large labour forces but if the market 
change they will not have enough educated workforce and unemployment 
will increase. States have to be proactive in their actions and that include 
regulating MNEs. 
    
It is important that states implement a clear regulation that demands 
qualified documentations from the MNEs.  States should carefully note and 
evaluate the actions done by MNE and objectively review their transfers. 
States should also demand to have an open dialogue with the MNE and the 
other states the MNE is functioning in. If states open up to each other, 
MNEs would not be able to play the states against each other. If states 
openly work together in specific MNE-cases, both have an interest and both 
will benefit of more information. 
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5 Corporate responsibility 
   “There is one and only one social responsibility of business – to use its 
resources and engage in activities designed to increase its profits so long as 
it stays within the rules of the game, which is to say, engages in open and 
free competition without deception or fraud”.127 – Milton Friedman 1963 
5.1 Guidelines for MNE 
The general guideline for MNE formulated by OECD is fund in “OECD 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises” and the 5th edition was published 
in 2011. Chapter XI that gives a general advice on how member states and 
MNE shall regard taxation. 
    
OECD encourages companies to follow the spirit of national law and 
comply with the levels on taxations without negotiation. Companies shall 
not feel obliged to pay any excess tax for being multinational if not legally 
required. MNE are encouraged to treat tax compliance as an important 
factor in its management strategies so that tax risks can be identified and 
evaluated. The company shall have a clear awareness of the tax 
responsibility and evaluate their actions to comply with international and 
national regulations.128  
    
OECD emphasises the importance of considering tax payment when doing a 
transaction. The underlying economic reasons for a transfer shall not be to 
modify tax payments. It is important that the company has solid 
documentation as a basis for the transfer even if the burden of 
documentation requirement and the tax relevance shall be balanced. Risk 
management, structures and policies shall all reflect the enterprises’ 
commitment to tax compliance and law. MNEs shall actively develop 
strategies, concerning the entire enterprise. These policies on taxes shall 
handle internal tax controls so that the overall operating tax supervision is 
consistent with the views of the company’s board of directors. With a solid 
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risk strategy MNE will be able to avoid financial losses and reputation 
degradation.129 
      
OECD considers transfer pricing to be of particular importance since it 
determines the tax bases’ between counties. The arm’s length price is 
considered to be the international used method to adjust profits.130  
5.1.1 Investors guide 
In May 2013 the international NGO ActionAid published an investor-guide 
regarding tax responsibility. They aim to assist companies when they wants 
to make taxation as one of their responsibilities. They list three steps 
companies should consider when implementing taxations in their policies. 
    
Firstly, the MNE need a clear tax policy. They should identify risk 
management and what the company approach should be in negotiations with 
tax authorities and business partners. It is important to have a clear policy so 
every unit in the MNE chain knows how to relate to tax in their state. The 
policy should preferably be detailed and rule out aggressive tax practices.131  
    
Secondly, the MNE need to take measures for implementation of the policy 
because without them the tax policy is of no use.  The policy needs to be 
communicated and their employees need to be informed.  Compliance 
mechanisms are suggested to simplify the procedure for the employees and 
provide a mechanism to identify measures that are not in compliance with 
the tax policy.132   
    
Thirdly, the MNE need to publish reports of their tax responsibilities in the 
states where they are stationed. This is especially of importance since it 
shows if the company practice is in compliance with the policy.133  
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5.1.2 UN guidelines 
UN launched the ‘UN Global Compact’ in 2011 as a strategic policy 
initiative where businesses are asked to embrace universal principles. The 
Global Compact focuses on human rights, labour, environment and anti-
corruption and how companies shall comply with the set goals.134 Acts 
connected to these areas has been discussed frequently within the Global 
Compact but so far has taxation not been suggested as a responsibility for 
businesses.  
    
UN has also published ‘Transfer Pricing Manual for Developing Countries’ 
as guidance for developing states. The manual does not contain any specific 
guidance for MNE and how they shall comply with TP. They do, however, 
state that the manual is developed in consistency with the OECD TPG, 
which offers guidance for both state and MNEs.135  
5.2 Social responsibility 
The definition of MNE unveils that they are situated in more than one state 
and therefore subjected to more than one legal system. State A might have a 
different legal system than State B and the principle of sovereignty prohibits 
State B to create regulations that intrude on State A’s jurisdiction. The 
regulation, in the developed State B, might be consistent with international 
legal recommendations regarding taxation, human rights and the use 
environmental hazard substances, while developing State A is struggling to 
get a functioning legal system. A problematic situation arises when a 
company from State B take advantage of the weaker legal system in state A 
to get a more profitable position. MNE have the possibility to use different 
legal systems that is suitable for them in different areas and this has created 
a debate regarding the MNEs’ social responsibilities when functioning in 
several states. 
    
According to Milton Friedman the only responsibility for MNE is to follow 
the national legislation.136 Then again, one has to understand that the world 
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has changed and national law is no longer the only regulation companies 
have to comply with in order to be a good citizen. A step to widen the 
responsibility for the MNE as well as to exercise some pressure upon the 
MNE to pay fair amount of taxes is the development of CSR reporting.  
5.2.1 Taxation and CSR 
The term ‘Corporate Social Responsibility’ was introduced 1953 in the book 
‘Social Responsibilities of the businessman’ by R.H Bowen but did not 
come into use until the 1960’s. It is important to recognize that even if 
academics, corporations and media all use the same term, CSR, as a generic 
name for the same phenomena, the functioning differs depending on which 
point of view they have.137 Traditionally the CSR-focus has been on human 
rights, environmental sustainability and labour rights. Recently some 
debaters suggested that every act that influences the traditional areas, such 
as taxation, should be part of CSR.138    
    
The European Commission published a new policy on corporate 
responsibility in 2011 where they give a new definition on the term CSR: 
“the responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society”.139 Today 
CSR is a way for companies to manage their business and not only as a 
description of the responsibilities they have to comply with. When 
establishing a subsidiary in another state the MNE has to choose an 
approach that they will comply with. This approach has to include the 
domestic regulation as well as the CSR aspect of their activities. For 
instance, if accepting the workers human rights as an area within the 
responsibility of the company, it should not be limited to specific concerns 
like working conditions and payments. Instead, they should see the broader 
picture, accept responsibility, and pay a fair amount of tax to the tax 
authority. Tax revenues will in return build schools that educate the work 
force and hospitals that cure them. This means that the company has to 
balance the tax responsibility for those they have a responsibility for.140  
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Many of the CSR concerns are connected to commercial decisions such as 
choice of supplier or areas for establishment. As residents in a state the 
MNE is subject to national legislation and taxation is not an optional cost 
for companies or individuals. It cannot be compensated by charity work for 
the community. The obligation to pay tax is not negotiable, even though 
many states make agreements on taxation levels and which taxation 
regulations that should be applicable on particular companies.141  
    
It should be noted that including taxation in the CSR would not demand any 
active action by the MNE. In fact, an acceptance of a taxation obligation 
would result in the company not putting recourses on tax avoidance and tax 
planning. The only responsibility would be to give confidence to the tax 
authorities ability to give a fair taxation level to the company.142  
5.2.2 Expectations on tax in CSR 
When including taxation as a CSR issue, it is important to give a clear 
indication on what is expected of the company. Even if the states are in 
control of taxation rates, there are still different actions a MNE can do to 
affect their tax liability. 
    
Firstly, when a company decides on establishing in a state, there will often 
be a negotiation with the tax authority on taxation levels and how the 
regulation should be applicable to the MNE. A big and influential company 
will choose to establish where they believe it will be most profitable for 
them. MNEs have the possibility choose a state, but a state never has the 
possibility to choose MNEs to establish in their state. MNEs are therefore in 
a strong position when negotiating with the state. They have little to loose if 
the authority denies any tax relief but much to gain when keeping a strong 
position in a negation.143 A MNE with a desire to comply with their CSR 
will have to exercise some restraint when negotiating with the authority. 
This would not be any different than MNEs restraining from the use of toxic 
chemicals or trying to convince the government to allow child labour. In 
many areas the MNE has accepted the fact that they should not use their 
power only because they can. Including taxation in CSR does not have to be 
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complicated, since they only have to refrain using their economic ‘muscles’ 
against the state.144 
    
Secondly, the companies choose if they want to avoid taxation or not. The 
tax planning procedure can be applied even if the MNE has been given tax 
advantages by a state. There risk is then that the government might 
withdraw the given benefit and this will not be profitable for the MNE. 
Even if it is not an illegal approach it might be frowned upon by the 
governments and the company might risk losing any tax relief given by the 
tax authority.145 MNE are recommended to explain their position on tax 
avoidance in their CSR.  
    
If MNEs are situated in developing or developed states the CSR-
expectations are different. A developed state does not need to negotiate on 
taxation levels to the same extent as a developing state. They are therefore 
in a stronger position in a negotiation against the MNE. For a developing 
state other beneficial contributions from the MNE might outweigh tax 
revenues.146  
5.3    Tax is not Corporate responsibility 
The main critique of CSR as a concept regards the lack of obligation and the 
voluntary nature. There is no obligation for MNE to establish a CSR and 
those who do not wish to commit to responsibilities cannot be legally 
forced. It is therefore argued that CSR only attract those already 
enlighten.147 The lack of obligation and follow-ups by independent 
organizations gives MNEs the freedom to promote their CSR as a marketing 
tool when associated with voluntary acts to create a better society.148 The 
concept of CSR is therefore not a sustainable solution for the goal to reach a 
uniform tax responsibility for MNEs.  
    
In many areas is it easier to show what a MNE does for the community or 
which chemicals they abstain from using. Today a variety of organisations 
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have created procedures for companies to comply with when handing in 
their CSR report. Bodies like the Global Reporting Initiative149, Social 
Accountability International150 and the Institute of Social and Ethical 
Accountability International151 have developed framework for reporting but 
since it is not a legal document there cannot be any sanctions for those who 
do not participate.152  
    
If including taxation in CSR reports the assessor also have make a valuation 
of each subsidiary contribution to the MNE. Otherwise the assessor cannot 
determine if profit-transfers is considered as tax avoidance or commercially 
justified. The MNE could easily to give a clear motivation of establishing 
subsidiaries in low tax jurisdictions. 
    
David Henderson, former head of the OECD (1984-1992) in Paris, wrote the 
book “Misguided Virtue: False Notions of Corporate Social Responsibility” 
in 2001. In the book he discusses whether or not MNEs’ economic 
profitability shall be incorporated when assessing the companies ability to 
‘give back to society’. Henderson states that a definition of ‘society’ needs 
to be made before including it as a responsibility for the MNEs.153 Through 
traditional CSR objects, such as human rights and environmental issues, 
MNEs give back to the community. Through taxation MNEs only 
contributes to the state. Some say that the state acts as a surrogate for the 
community since they have responsibilities to all citizens. A problematic 
situation arises when the priorities made by the government do not comply 
with the CSR of the MNE or even international human rights.154 Therefore, 
it has to be determined to whom MNEs have responsibilities to – the state or 
the citizens? In most cases this might this not be a contradiction, but shall it 
be within the MNEs responsibility to ensure that their tax revenues do not 
end up financing a corrupt government that abuses the citizens? If the 
responsibility is towards the citizens in the community some MNE will 
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claim they can do more good with charitable giving and specific welfare 
systems for employees and their families.155 
    
CSR issues often result in a demand of ‘fair’ contribution by the MNE. 
There is however not a uniform definition on what is considered to be fair 
and this creates confusion. Who shall the company compare with to 
determine what a fair contribution should be? Companies in their home 
state, domestic or other foreign companies in the host state or should a 
separate determination be done based on their ability to contribute? Politics 
will play a role in determining the fair contribution by a MNE. Many left 
wing governments tend to promote higher taxation levels or have a wider 
taxation base. A MNE establishing in state A might have to pay lower 
taxation on profit, royalties and VAT but have pay higher salary to their 
workers since they have a high income tax. Many factors need to be taken 
into consideration when determining the fair contribution by the MNE.156   
5.4 Analysis 
MNEs have the responsibility to comply with national legislations and 
BTTs. By avoiding taxation they act within the legal sphere and are 
therefore complying with their legal obligations. Just because MNEs have 
the legal possibility to avoid taxation does not mean all of them take 
advantage of it. They are also allowed to cut down rain forests and use child 
labour sin some states but the moral obligation stops some MNEs to act 
unethical. As part of a state the population expect every member to 
contribute. Regarding the situation of Starbucks157, they would not have 
gained this amount of profit if it were not established in a rich and 
developed state as the United Kingdom. MNEs need states and their 
citizens, but they do not always consider their responsibility to contribute. 
MNE needs their costumers and bad publicity can result in the loss of 
customers. 
    
The social responsibilities should be based on actions taken to support the 
people or the environment. If MNE were to include taxation into CSR, there 
is a risk that it would also result in contradictions. Many developing states 
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suffer from dictatorship and corruption and by paying more tax it might 
contribute to governmental abuse of the population. To determine if the tax 
revenue paid benefits the population or not, would be too much 
responsibility for MNE.  
    
MNE are however encouraged by OECD to develop internal policies on 
taxation. Develop taxation policies similar to CSR would be beneficial not 
only for the state and consumer, but also for the MNE and its subsidiaries. It 
would give guidance on how the subsidiaries shall act. The problem with tax 
policies would be the same problems as faces CSR reports today. Only those 
who are already enlightened in the area will comply. Others might formulate 
the policy in a vague manner that would make tax avoidance possible. Even 
if not ideal solution, when creating a policy it would make MNEs reflect on 
their taxation responsibility.  
    
MNEs main responsibility is towards their stockholders.  They are expecting 
the MNE to act as profitable as possible within the legal boarders. Effective 
responsibility for MNE can only be enforced through regulating MNEs 
actions on a national level.  
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6 Conclusions 
Tax avoidance is a problematic issue for states and their citizens. When 
profits are transferred from developing state to developed states, it 
misallocates the capital and profit distribution in the world. When not 
receiving tax revenues developing states experience difficulties to improve 
their society. They have fewer resources to educate the population, as they 
otherwise would have done. The state will consequently have problems to 
contribute with innovation and the globalisation process will be negatively 
impacted. The gaps between rich and poor states increases and this is 
damaging for everyone.  
 
Even though developing states are suffering from tax avoidance, they are 
also in strongest need of MNEs. They need MNEs to expand and continue 
to help with the state’s development. The tax revenues might be small, but it 
is still revenues they would not have received unless the MNE had 
established in the country.  
 
A reason why the TP issues have been highlighted in the past decade might 
be since it has now started to hurt the developed states. With the Starbucks 
and Amazon examples, we could see how effectively they transferred profits 
between some of the world’s most developed legal systems. Once the 
problem started to occur in developed states it got more attention in media. 
It resulted in dissatisfied customers and citizens. Developed states are also 
in a better position to enforce a change.  
 
PT is today the mechanism used to control the split of profits. There are 
many problems with the methods and it has shown not to prevent MNEs 
who wants to avoid taxation. Therefore it cannot be regarded as a successful 
tool. It does contain a successful functions such as it ensures payment to 
workers in subsidies.  
 
The problem with transfer pricing is that the governments has limited 
regulation to ALP. ALP has on the other hade become so wide that there is 
plenty of room for MNEs to find a suitable comparable asset. Governments 
have little possibility to make MNEs stop avoiding tax when using ALP. 
OECD have recognised ALP as the best solution for regulating the division 
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of profit. OECD also presents the alternative method GFA. With this 
method states gets better control of MNEs. 
 
State has the responsibility to control MNE and therefore is it important that 
the regulation is clear and transparent. To create such a regulation the states 
need to share experiences, but most of all they need to collaborate. If one 
state creates a clear and firm regulation for MNEs situated within the state, 
the MNEs will move their business to another state. It is therefore of crucial 
importance that states work together and decide on similar regulation in 
every state. OECD states in their critique of GFA that the implementation of 
a common regulation would be too complicated and states have not jet 
shown the willingness to cooperate.  
 
There have been suggestions that taxation should be included in a MNEs 
CSR. When avoiding tax in a state, it will ultimately hurt the citizens and 
therefore is it a matter for CSR. MNE shall regard every act and be aware of 
the consequences. The idea of CSR is that it shall start where the law stops. 
If there is no tax regulation, states shall declare a tax policy of their own. A 
tax policy would be a reasonable demand, but to include tax into CSR 
would be to give the MNEs to much responsibility. MNEs would have to 
defend establishment in corrupts states and be aware of how the government 
distribute tax revenues. It is a risk that the CSR becomes contradictory 
because of acts committed outside of the MNE’s control.   
 
A tax policy that shows how the board of directors relate to taxation could 
be a useful tool for the subsidiaries. The policy should not be too detailed 
nor contain specific acts that should be taken to comply with the policy. The 
creation of the policy would be voluntarily and too much responsibility 
might make MNEs hesitate. One shall not forget that MNEs’ responsibility 
is to the stockholders. If they have nothing to gain, they are unlikely to 
commit to a policy.  
 
In situations that lack regulation, it is important that every party take 
responsibility of their actions.  
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Supplement A 
Article 9 – Associated enterprises 
OECD adopted “Articles of Model Convention with respect to taxes on 
income and on capital” in January 2003 where article 9 concerns 
‘Associated Enterprises’. This convention is applicable to all 34 OECD 
member states.  
1. Where: 
a. an enterprise of an Contracting State participates directly or 
indirectly in the management, control or capital of an 
enterprise of the other Contracting State, or 
b. the same persons participate directly or indirectly in the 
management, control or capital of an enterprise of a 
Contracting State and an enterprise of the other Contracting 
State, 
and in either case conditions are made or imposed between the two 
enterprises in their commercial or financial relations which differ 
from those which would be made between independent enterprises, 
then any profit which would, but for those conditions, have accrued 
to one of the enterprises, but, by reason of those conditions, have not 
so accrued, may be included in the profits of that enterprise and 
taxed accordingly. 
 
2. Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of 
that State – and taxes accordingly – profits on which an enterprise 
of the other Contracting State has been charged to tax in that other 
State and the profits so included are the profits which would have 
accrues to the enterprise of the first-mentioned State if the 
conditions made between the two enterprises had been those which 
have been between independent enterprises, then that other State 
shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the tax 
charged therein those profits. In determining such adjustments, due 
regard shall be had to the other provisions of the Convention and 
the competent authorities of the Contracting State shall, if necessary, 
consult each other. 
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In 2011 did the Department of Economic & social Affairs of United Nation 
adopt this article 9 and added a third paragraph in the United Nations 
“Model Double Taxation Convention between Developed and Developing 
Countries”.  This double taxation convention is applicable to all 193 UN 
member state.  
 
3. The provisions of paragraph 2 shall not apply where judicial, 
administrative or other legal proceedings have resulted in a final 
ruling that by actions giving rise to an adjustment of profits under 
paragraph 1, one of the enterprises concerned is liable to penalty 
with respect to fraud, gross negligence or wilful default.    
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